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Abstract
In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean
preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile
of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof
and Pareto optimal rule is a dictatorial. This framework models situations
where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have
to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc.
JEL Classification: D71
Keywords: Single-dipped preferences, strategy-proofness
1 Introduction and model
This paper contributes to the following question: Where to locate a public
bad (noxious facility) like for instance a garbage dumping ground or nuclear
plant within a given region? Specifically, we assume that a finite number of
agents, equipped with single-dipped Euclidean preferences, reaches a decision
by voting. The dips (worst locations) of these agents are private knowledge –
e.g., residence, children’s school, etc. – and thus we require the (voting) rule to
be strategy-proof in order to elicit the true information about these dips. We
also require the rule to be Pareto optimal, and assume the region to be a disc,
i.e., a circle and its interior, in the Euclidean plane. This choice is quite specific.
In a companion paper (O¨ztu¨rk et al, 2012) we study strategy-proof and Pareto
optimal rules for the case where A is a polytope in R2, i.e., the convex hull of
finitely many points. We find that such rules can be based on majority voting
and more generally voting by committees (simple games) if either the region
is sufficiently flat (in terms of width) or the region is (basically) a rectangle
and its inside. In all other cases such rules are dictatorial, including all regular
polytopes except for the square. We conjecture that similar results will hold on
general compact convex sets, being the ‘limits’ of polytopes, and in the present
note indeed show dictatorship on the disc. We need, however, a separate proof
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and are not (yet) able to extend the result for polytopes by some limit argument.
The general case of compact convex regions in R2 is therefore still open.
Formally, we consider the following collective decision problem. The set of
alternatives is the disc A = {x ∈ R2 : ||x|| ≤ 1}, where || · || denotes Euclidean
distance. The set of agents is N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2. Each agent has a
single-dipped Euclidean preference on A, characterized by a dip a ∈ A such that
x ∈ A is weakly preferred to y ∈ A if and only if ||x− a|| ≥ ||y − a||. A profile
is a vector p ∈ AN , where p(i) is the dip of agent i, for each i ∈ N . A rule
ϕ assigns to each p ∈ AN a collective decision ϕ(p) ∈ A. A rule ϕ is strategy-
proof if for all i ∈ N and p, q ∈ AN with p(j) = q(j) for all j ∈ N \ {i} we have
||ϕ(p)−p(i)|| ≥ ||ϕ(q)−p(i)||. It is not difficult to verify that strategy-proofness
is equivalent to the following property, which we will use interchangeably. A
rule ϕ is intermediate strategy-proof if for every coalition S ⊆ N and all profiles
p, q ∈ AN such that p(j) = q(j) for all j ∈ N\S and there is an alternative a with
p(i) = a for all i ∈ S, we have ||ϕ(p)−a|| ≥ ||ϕ(q)−a||. A rule ϕ is Pareto optimal
if for every p ∈ AN , every a ∈ A and every i ∈ N , if ||a− p(i)|| > ||ϕ(p)− p(i)||
then there is a j ∈ N such that ||a− p(j)|| < ||ϕ(p)− p(j)||.
Other existing work on strategy-proofness under single-dipped preferences
(for the public good/bad case) is confined to one-dimensional regions, specif-
ically Peremans and Storcken (1999), Barbera` et al (2009), and Manjunath
(2009). In our proof below we use decisive coalitions and ultrafilters, cf. Hans-
son (1976). There is also a literature on locating noxious facilities if monetary
transfers are possible, see e.g. Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986) for a relatively
early reference.
2 Dictatorship
In this section we prove our main result.
Theorem 2.1 Let ϕ : AN → A be a rule. Then ϕ is strategy-proof and Pareto
optimal if and only if ϕ is dictatorial, i.e., there is an agent d such that ||ϕ(p)−
p(d)|| ≥ ||x− p(d)|| for every p ∈ AN and every x ∈ A.
Observe that for every x ∈ A \ {0} (where 0 = (0, 0) ∈ R2) there is a unique
point on the boundary ∂A of A that has maximal distance from x; we denote
this point by x̂. In particular, if x ∈ ∂A then x̂ = −x. If x = 0 then all points
of ∂A are at maximal distance (namely, 1) from x. Hence, if ϕ is dictatorial
with dictator d then ϕ(p) = p̂(d) whenever p(d) 6= 0, and ϕ(p) ∈ ∂A if p(d) = 0.
For a, b ∈ ∂A we denote the closed arc between a and b by [aab]. (If b = −a
then [aab] is defined to be ∂A, i.e., the full circle.) Also, [aab[= [aab] \ {b},
]aab] = [aab] \ {a}, and ]aab[= [aab] \ {a, b}.
For x, y ∈ A and S ⊆ N we denote by p = (xS , yN\S) the profile with
p(i) = x for all i ∈ S and p(i) = y for all i ∈ N \ S. The first lemma says that
if ϕ is Pareto optimal then it assigns a boundary point to each such two-dip
profile.
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Lemma 2.2 Let ϕ : AN → A be Pareto optimal, and let x, y ∈ A and S ⊆ N .
Then ϕ(xS , yN\S) ∈ ∂A.
Proof. Let a = ϕ(xS , yN\S). If a /∈ ∂A then let ℓ be the straight line through a
and perpendicular to the straight line ℓ′ through x and y if x 6= y; if x = y then
let ℓ be the straight line through a and x. The line ℓ intersects ∂A in a point
b on the other side of a than the point of intersection with ℓ′, or the point x if
x = y. Then b Pareto dominates a at the profile (xS , yN\S), a contradiction.
Until further notice, ϕ : AN → A is strategy-proof and Pareto optimal.
Lemma 2.3 Let a ∈ ∂A and S ⊆ N . Then ϕ(aS , âN\S) ∈ {a, â}.
Proof. In the proof only two-dip profiles are considered: therefore, by Lemma
2.2, their outcomes under ϕ are in ∂A. Contrary to what is to prove, assume
that ϕ(aS , âN\S) = b where b /∈ {a, â}. Without loss of generality we may
assume that ||a − b|| ≤ ||â − b||. For x, y ∈ ∂A let yx be the point on ∂A such
that {y, yx} = {z ∈ ∂A : ||x− z|| = ||x− y||}.
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Figure 1: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 2.3; z = ϕ(cS , âN\S)
First we prove that ϕ(bS , âN\S) = ba. (See Fig. 1(a).) Consider c ∈ [aab[.
Since ||a− b|| ≤ ||â− b||, strategy-proofness implies ϕ(cS , âN\S) ∈ {b}∪ [bcaba].
Pareto optimality yields that ϕ(cS , âN\S) ∈ [ĉaa]. Clearly b /∈ [ĉaa]. So,
ϕ(cS , âN\S) ∈ [bcaba]. Note that we just showed that ϕ(x
S , âN\S) ∈ [bxaba] for
all x ∈ [aab[. Suppose ϕ(cS , âN\S) 6= ba. Then we can choose d ∈ [aac[ such
that [bdaba] ⊆ ]ϕ(c
S , âN\S), ba]. Since ϕ(d
S , âN\S) ∈ [bdaba] this implies that
||ϕ(dS , âN\S) − c|| > ||ϕ(cS , âN\S) − c||, which obviously contradicts strategy-
proofness. So, ϕ(cS , âN\S) = ba. Since the choice of c was arbitrary this proves
that ϕ(xS , âN\S) = ba for all x ∈ [aab[. Strategy-proofness now implies that
ϕ(bS , âN\S) = ba.
Next we prove (see Fig. 1(b)) that ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) ∈ {ba, (ba)b̂}. Consider c ∈
]̂baâ[. Since ϕ(bS , âN\S) = ba, strategy-proofness implies that ϕ(b
S , cN\S) ∈
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{ba} ∪ [(ba)cab]. Since Pareto optimality implies ϕ(b
S , cN\S) ⊆ [̂baĉ] it follows
that ϕ(bS , cN\S) = ba. So we proved that ϕ(b
S , xN\S) = ba for all x ∈]̂baâ[.
Strategy-proofness now implies that ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) ∈ {ba, (ba)b̂}.
Finally we prove ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) = b, which is a contradiction since b /∈
{ba, (ba)b̂}, and thus completes the proof. Since ϕ(a
S , âN\S) = b, strategy-
proofness implies ϕ(aS , b̂N\S) = b. For d ∈ [aab[ strategy-proofness implies
ϕ(dS , b̂N\S) ∈ {b}∪[bdaba]. Pareto optimality now implies that ϕ(d
S , b̂N\S) = b.
By the arbitrary choice of d we have ϕ(xS , b̂N\S) = b for all x ∈ [aab[. So
strategy-proofness implies ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) = b.
The next lemma shows that at two-dip profiles as in Lemma 2.3 always the
same coalition gets its best point.
Lemma 2.4 Let S ⊆ N . Then either ϕ(xS , x̂N\S) = x̂ for all x ∈ ∂A or
ϕ(xS , x̂N\S) = x for all x ∈ ∂A.
Proof. Let a, b ∈ ∂A. In view of Lemma 2.3 we may assume without loss of
generality that ϕ(aS , âN\S) = â. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) = b̂.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: {a, â} ∩ {b, b̂} = ∅. To the contrary, suppose ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) 6= b̂. Then
Lemma 2.3 yields ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) = b. Strategy-proofness and ϕ(aS , âN\S) = â
imply ϕ(aS , b̂N\S) = â. But strategy-proofness and ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) = b imply
ϕ(aS , b̂N\S) = b. This yields the contradiction b = â.
Case 2: b = â. So, {a, â} = {b, b̂}. Take c ∈ ∂A \ {a, â, b, b̂}. Applying the
previous case yields first ϕ(cS , ĉN\S) = ĉ and by this result that ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) =
b̂.
Call a coalition S ⊆ N decisive if for every a ∈ A and every profile p ∈ AN
with p(i) = a for all i ∈ N we have ϕ(p) = â if a 6= 0 and ϕ(p) ∈ ∂A if a = 0.
The next two lemmas deal with decisive coalitions.
Lemma 2.5 Let S ⊆ N . Then S is decisive or N \ S is decisive.
Proof. In view of Lemma 2.4, we may assume without loss of generality that
ϕ(aS , âN\S) = â for all a ∈ ∂A. We prove that S is decisive. Take b ∈ A and
p ∈ AN such that p(i) = b for all i ∈ S. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ(p) is at
maximal distance from b. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: b 6= 0. Let c = −b̂. By assumption ϕ(cS , b̂N\S) = b̂. But then
strategy-proofness implies ||b−ϕ(bS , b̂N\S)|| ≥ ||b− b̂||. Hence, ϕ(bS , b̂N\S) = b̂.
Strategy-proofness now implies ϕ(p) = b̂.
Case 2: b = 0. By the previous case it follows that ϕ(q) ∈ ∂A for all profiles
q such that q(j) = p(j) for all j ∈ N \ S and q(i) = x for all i ∈ S, for some
x ∈ A \ {0}. Now strategy-proofness implies that ϕ(p) ∈ ∂A.
Lemma 2.6 Let S, T ⊆ N be both decisive. Then S ∩ T is decisive.
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Proof. To the contrary suppose that S ∩ T is not decisive. Then, by Lemma
2.5, N \ (S ∩ T ) is decisive. Let X = S \ T , Y = S ∩ T , and Z = N \ S. So
X ∪ Y = S, Y ∪ Z = N \ (S \ T ) ⊇ T and X ∪ Z = N \ (S ∩ T ) are decisive.
Further, let p = (aX , bY , cZ) with a, b, c ∈ ∂A (hence agents in X have their
dips at a, agents in Y at b, and agents in Z at c), and such that a, b, and c are
the vertices of an equilateral triangle. (See Fig. 2(a).) Since X ∪ Y is decisive,
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ĉ
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â1
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b
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Figure 2: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 2.6
hence ϕ(bX∪Y , cZ) = b̂, it follows by strategy-proofness that
||a− ϕ(p)|| ≥ ||a− b̂||.
Similarly, since X ∪ Z and Y ∪ Z are decisive we have ϕ(aX∪Z , bY ) = â and
ϕ(aX , cY ∪Z) = ĉ so that strategy-proofness implies that
||c− ϕ(p)|| ≥ ||c− â|| and ||b− ϕ(p)|| ≥ ||b− ĉ||.
Therefore, ϕ(p) ∈ {0, â, b̂, ĉ}, but 0 is Pareto dominated by for instance â.
Without loss of generality, assume that ϕ(p) = â. Take a1 ∈ ]aab̂[ close to a.
By applying the above argument with a1 instead of a, we find for the profile
p′ = (aX
1
, bY , cZ) in particular the inequalities ||c − ϕ(p′)|| ≥ ||c − â1|| and
||b − ϕ(p′)|| ≥ ||b − ĉ||. For points x ∈ A satisfying these inequalities we have
(see Fig. 2(b)) ||a1−x|| ≤ ||a1− ĉ||, hence in particular ||a1−ϕ(p
′)|| ≤ ||a1− ĉ||.
Since ||a1−ĉ|| < ||a1−â|| by the choice of a1, and since ϕ(p) = â, coalitionX can
manipulate from p′ to p, and thus we have a violation of strategy-proofness.
By Pareto optimality and Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 the collection D of decisive
coalitions satisfies (i) ∅ /∈ D, (ii) if S, T ∈ D, then S ∩T ∈ D, and (iii) S ∈ D or
N \S ∈ D. Thus, D is an ultrafilter and it is well-known and straightforward to
prove that there is a unique d ∈ N with {d} ∈ D. Clearly then, ϕ is dictatorial
with dictator d. This proves the only-if direction of Theorem 2.1. Since, trivially,
a dictatorial rule is strategy-proof and Pareto optimal, the proof of Theorem
2.1 is complete.
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